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IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIES FOR THE MODEL LAW ON
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: THE DIVERGENCE IN ASIAPACIFIC AND LESSONS FOR UNCITRAL
Wai Yee Wan*
Gerard McCormack**
ABSTRACT
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (“Model Law”)
was conceived with the aim of providing a framework for states to obtain
consistency in the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and granting
relief in aid of the foreign courts. The Model Law has achieved moderate success
internationally and four states in the Asia-Pacific, namely Australia, Singapore,
Japan, and Korea, have enacted legislation based on the Model Law. Scholars
agree on the importance of consistent implementation of the Model Law in
managing cross-border insolvency to achieve quick, certain, and predictable
outcomes.
However, the Model Law’s aims have not been completely met and existing
accounts point to two reasons for why there is a lack of complete harmonization.
First, states have not fully implemented the Model Law in their domestic law.
Second, states’ judiciaries have not consistently interpreted their legislation
enacting the Model Law. This lack of harmony is reflected in the fact that
UNCITRAL recently felt the need to promulgate a supplemental Model Law on
Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments.
In this Article, we examine the divergent implementation strategies of the
Model Law in Australia, Singapore, Japan, and Korea, and explain the reasons
for the divergence. In the case of Japan and Korea, legal origins have been put
forward as a reason for the divergence; as these two jurisdictions are not based
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on common law, they require greater local modification to assure the Model
Law will fit into their legal systems. However, we argue legal origins are
insufficient reasons for the lack of uniformity. Instead, we argue that where
states, like Australia and Singapore, are shifting from a moderately territorialist
approach with cross-border insolvency to the modified universalist approach as
envisaged by the Model Law, they are more likely to fully implement the Model
Law. Where States start from an exclusively territorialist approach (such as in
Japan and Korea), they are likely to recognize foreign insolvency proceedings
as a broad signal of their international commitment towards adopting global
norms, but would demand changes to allow for some room to depart from all of
the consequences of recognition of foreign proceedings, even in situations where
there may be no real impediment for the implementation of Model Law.
However, in Korea, there are signs that judicial attitudes are changing as the
judiciary sees the benefits of the Model Law in cooperation and communication,
and there may be a greater chance of implementation.
Our study illustrates the limitations of achieving the objectives of the Model
Law. We argue that when determining the strategies for uniform implementation
of UNCITRAL, in the context of “soft law,” we should take into account the
importance of the signaling effect and path dependency of the countries, which
will have implications for other jurisdictions considering the adoption of the
Model Law or the supplementary Model Law on insolvency-related judgments.
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INTRODUCTION
With the rise of multi-state enterprises and complexities in resolving crossborder insolvencies, in 1997, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model
Law)1 was conceived. The Model Law aims to grant foreign courts relief by
providing an adoptable, consistent framework for countries to obtain recognition
of foreign insolvency proceedings. 2 The Model Law promotes cooperation
between courts by giving foreign creditors or foreign representatives access to
local courts in states where the debtor’s assets are located.3 The objective of the
Model Law is facilitating, to the maximum extent possible, the optimal
management of cross-border insolvency, so as to benefit debtors, creditors, and
other stakeholders, as well as the economies in which these stakeholders
function.4 The Model Law has achieved moderate success internationally, with
major common law jurisdictions including the United Kingdom (UK), 5 the
United States (US),6 Australia,7 and more recently Singapore,8 having changed
their domestic laws on cross-border insolvency cooperation based on the Model

1
See generally G.A. Res. A/RES/52/158, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (Jan. 30, 1999 [Hereinafter “Model Law”].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1030 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/
2006/1030/contents/made; Insolvency Act 2000 c. 39, § 14 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/39/
pdfs/ukpga_20000039_en.pdf.
6
11 U.S.C §§1501–1532 (2019).
7
Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 sched. 6 (Austl.) (stating that section 6 that the Model Law, subject
to some modifications, has the force of law in Australia).
8
Companies Act, ch. 50, sched. 10 (2006) (Sing.) [hereinafter “Companies Act 2006”]. The 2017
reforms to the Companies Act which incorporate, among others, the Model Law, draw on the recommendations
made by Singapore’s Insolvency Law Review Committee (ILRC) in its report in 2013, but more directly on
those made in the subsequent report of the Committee to Strengthen Singapore as an International Centre for
Debt Restructuring (Restructuring Committee) in 2016. See INSOLVENCY L. REV. COMMITTEE, REP. OF THE
INSOLVENCY L. REV. COMMITTEE: FINAL REP. (2013), https://app.mlaw.gov.sg/files/news/announcements/2013/
10/ReportoftheInsolvencyLawReviewCommittee.pdf [hereinafter “2013 Report”]; COMMITTEE TO
STRENGTHEN SINGAPORE AS AN INT’L CTR. FOR DEBT RESTRUCTURING: REP. OF THE COMMITTEE (2016), https://
app.mlaw.gov.sg/files/news/public-consultations/2016/04/Final%20DR%20Report.pdf.
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Law provisions.9 Japan10 and Korea11 have also enacted legislation based on the
Model Law, albeit with adaptations and modifications.
The goals of the Model Law are certainty, predictability, and speed in
obtaining recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and coordination of
those proceedings, so as to protect the debtor’s assets for maximum distribution
to the creditors.12 By having a uniform framework, the Model Law “provides a
well-understood framework for foreign parties and reduces the need for foreign
representatives to have to seek advice on domestic law,” 13 thereby reducing
transaction costs. However, despite the ostensible adoption of the Model Law
among the participating states, the academic literature has documented several
reasons for why there lacks complete harmonization of insolvency assistance
and enhanced cooperation.14 First, since the Model Law is “soft law” (does not
operate by way of a treaty), states have not implemented all of the Model Law
provisions consistently in their domestic law, even though the Guide to the
Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border
Insolvency (Guide) recommends there be as few deviations as possible. 15
Second, despite the existence of the Guide, the courts in the adopting states have

9
As of July 2018, forty-four states have adopted the Model Law. UNCITRAL, OVERVIEW OF THE
STATUS OF THE UNCITRAL CONVENTIONS AND MODEL LAWS (2019), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.
org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/overview-status-table_2.pdf.
10
Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings, Law No 129 of 2000, 31(2)
(Japan), translated in Junichi Matsushita & Stacy Steele, Law Relating to Recognition and Assistance for
Foreign Insolvency Proceedings, (Law No. 129 of 2000) (Jan. 12, 2005), https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/
files/12-_Japanese_insolvency_law_129_of_2000.pdf [Hereinafter “Recognition Law”].
11
Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act, Act No. 7428, March 2005, amended by Act. No. 8863,
Feb. 29, 2008, (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Ministry of Government Legislation http://www.moleg.go.kr/
english/korLawEng?pstSeq=52645 [Hereinafter “DRBA”].
12
Jay L. Westbrook, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES OF THE
MODEL LAW ON CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 250 (2013) (identifying certainty and
speed as central goals of UNCITRAL); see also U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, at 21, ¶ 8, U.N. Sales No.
E.14.V.2 (2013) (pointing out the drawbacks of the regime without a Model Law).
13
UNCITRAL-INSOL-World Bank, 11th Multinational Judicial Colloquium, at 12, ¶ 33, (Mar. 21–22,
2015), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/EleventhJC.pdf.
14
See generally LOOK CHAN HO, CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW, 324 (Globe L. and Bus., 4th ed. 2017); S. CHANDRA MOHAN, Cross‐border Insolvency Problems:
Is the UNCITRAL Model Law the Answer?, 21 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 143, 199–223 (2012).
15
U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, at 25, ¶ 20, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2013). The Guide to
Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency [Hereinafter “Guide”]
contains the background and explanatory statement to the Model Law. The original guide was issued by
UNCITRAL in 1997, in conjunction with the adoption of the Model Law, and the Guide was revised in 2013.
See generally LOOK CHAN HO, THE REVISED UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ENACTMENT GUIDE—A WELCOME
PRODUCT?, J. INT’L BANKING L. Rev. 325 (Thomson Reuters 2014).
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not interpreted the legislation enacting the Model Law consistently. 16 The
divergence of the implementation strategies of the Model Law raises the
question of whether the Model Law promotes the goals of achieving a quick,
certain, and predictable outcome in cross-border insolvency proceedings.17
In this paper, we examine the extent to which the Model Law has been
enacted and implemented in four economically significant Asia-Pacific
jurisdictions: Australia, Singapore, Korea, and Japan—with the former two
being common law countries and the latter two being civil law countries. In
making the comparison, we take into account the theory of “functional
equivalents” in comparative law which holds that a rule which takes a positive
legal form in one system may be expressed in other legal systems in a different
fashion.18 Further, we examine how the domestic legislation implementing the
Model Law has been interpreted in Australia, Singapore, and Korea.19 We seek
to assess whether the Model Law’s goals of speed, certainty, and predictability
are met, the reasons behind the divergent implementation and interpretation of
the Model Law, and the future of the jurisprudence on the Model Law.
Various theories have been put forth to explain the divergence in approaches
respecting the enactment and interpretation of the Model Law. On a general
level, one can argue this divergence merely reflects how insolvency policies and
procedures differ substantially between states. Lord Millett observed that “no
16
But see UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Perspective, (Mar. 2014),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Judicial-Perspective-2013-e.pdf. This document was
developed by UNCITRAL in response to requests from participants at biennial UNCITRAL/INSOL/World Bank
multinational judicial colloquia, for more information on the application and interpretation of the Model Law.
The principal author is the New Zealand judge, Paul Heath, and it is intended to assist judges on questions arising
on an application for recognition under the Model Law. It has since been revised.
17
G.A. Res. A/RES/52/158, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (Jan. 30, 1998). The Guide has recommended that as few deviations be made to the
Model Law as possible, so as to increase the uniformity and transparency on cross-border insolvency and obtain
cooperation from the other States, at para. 22. U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, at 26, ¶ 22, U.N. Sales No.
E.14.V.2 (2013).
18
See generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony
Weir trans., Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1992).
19
For Japan, the Case Law on UNCITRAL Text (CLOUT), which contains summaries of cases on the
Model Law, has very few English translation of the decisions on the legislation based on the Model Law in Japan
(four): Search Results for English Translation Summary of Cases on Model Law, UNCITRAL, http://www.
uncitral.org/clout/index.jspx (follow “Search” hyperlink; then search “cases” and apply additional criteria
“Country: Japan”) (generating only four search results). These decisions are not relevant for the purposes of this
Article. Checkmarks with Japanese practitioners indicate that there is no major Japanese case law on the
legislation implementing the Model Law. For Korea, we relied on decisions translated in CLOUT as well as the
English translation found on the website of the Supreme Court of Korea. Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Ma1600,
Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.).
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branch of the law is moulded more by considerations of national economic
policy and commercial philosophy.” 20 More specifically, with respect to the
adoption of the Model Law by civil law jurisdictions in Asia, scholars like
Yamatomo argue that different legal origins explain why Korea and Japan have
different strategies for implementing the Model Law. Korea and Japan follow
the civil law, distinct from the common law tradition.21
As attractive as the legal origin explanation appears, at least two issues exist
with this explanation. First, while some provisions in the Model Law might pose
difficulty for civil law countries to adopt unequivocally, such as provisions
relating to the conferment of judicial discretion, the scholarly literature on
Japanese or Korean jurisprudence does not suggest that the reasons for not
adopting the provisions lies in the constraints found in civil law traditions. In
fact, the evidence shows the contrary. For example, Korea and Japan’s decision
not to adopt the Model Law’s automatic stay following the recognition of foreign
main proceedings does not lie in the constraints found in their civil law
traditions.22 Further, Korea has not adopted, in full, the judicial cooperation and
coordination in the Korean Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act in 2006
(DRBA),23 the legislation that implements the Model Law, and yet the recent
Memorandum of Understanding entered into by the Korean courts with the
Singapore and New York courts, both common law countries, signals a
willingness to cooperate.24
Drawing from the four jurisdictions, however, we argue that legal origins
provide only a partial explanation for the divergence in implementation. Instead,
the explanation is based on a dichotomy in how states approach cross-border
insolvency: universality and territoriality. 25 The universalist principle is
premised on the view that only the courts of the bankrupt’s “home jurisdiction”
have control of, and may administer, the bankrupt debtor’s assets and that there
should only be one governing law. In contrast, the territorialist principle is one

20

Peter Millet, Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Approach, 6 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 99, 109

(1997).
21
Kazuhiko Yamamoto, New Japanese Legislation on Cross-border Insolvency as Compared with the
UNCITRAL Model Law, 11 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 67, 68–69 (2002) (arguing that in the case of Japan, the
possibility of giving greater discretion to judges in the manner envisaged by the common law may cause
confusion).
22
See discussion infra Section I(B)(5).
23
See discussion infra Section I(B)(6).
24
See discussion infra Section I(B)(6).
25
Memorandum from Jay L. Westbrook to U.S. Nat’l Bankr. Rev. Comm. (July 29, 1998), Re:
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (July 29, 1997), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
nbrc/report/e1.pdf.
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where each country has jurisdiction over the portion of the bankrupt debtor’s
assets within its territory only. Thus, there will be multiple proceedings if the
debtor’s assets are located in multiple jurisdictions, and there is no obligation to
recognize proceedings in the other jurisdictions. There are also many
combinations and variations between the two dichotomies in practice.26 It is
beyond the scope of this article to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
either approach.27 Mervorach has argued that certain universal biases explain the
states’ territorialist approaches (such as preserving the status quo and aversion
to perceived loss of sovereignty and control over local assets) and not by the
expected utility of such approaches.28 Recognising that neither the pure version
of the universalist nor the territorialist principle is ideal or in the best interests
of management of multi-national insolvencies, the Model Law adopts a
“modified universalist” principle.29 It allows for the opening of more than one
set of insolvency proceedings, particularly in states where the debtor has a
business presence, and strives for maximum cooperation and coordination
among the various proceedings.
To this end, the Model Law, which is confined to procedural issues in crossborder insolvency but is otherwise neutral as to the choice of law, provides for
four main elements in relation to the conduct of cross-border insolvency cases:
access, recognition, relief (assistance), and cooperation.30 The access provisions
allow the foreign insolvency representative a right of access to the local court.
The recognition provisions enable the court to recognize foreign proceedings
either as a “foreign main proceeding” or a “foreign non-main proceeding.” The
relief provisions allow relief to be available to assist in a foreign insolvency
proceeding. The extent of the relief depends on whether the foreign proceeding
is a “foreign main proceeding,” which allows the automatic stay of actions
against the debtor and its assets, or whether it is a “foreign non-main
proceeding,” where more limited relief is available and is largely discretionary.
The cooperation provisions permit cooperation and direct communication
between the local and foreign court or foreign insolvency representatives. They
also establish the coordination required for the management of concurrent

26
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999).
27
See generally IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (Oxford University
Press 2d ed. 2005).
28
Mevorach, infra note 32, at § 2.
29
See JAY L. WESTBROOK, National Regulation of Multinational Default, in ECONOMIC LAW AND
JUSTICE IN TIMES OF GLOBALISATION: FESTSCHRIFT FOR CARL BAUDENBACHER 777 (Mario Monti et al. eds.,
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2007).
30
Guide, supra note 15, at 26–27, ¶ 24.
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proceedings, the aim of which is to “foster decisions that would best achieve the
objectives of both proceedings.”31
We argue that where states start from the position of having moderately
territorialist approaches towards cross-border insolvency, they are more likely
to adopt wholesale the moderately universalist approach found in the Model
Law. 32 However, where states start from the position of an exclusively
territorialist approach, even in the presence of external pressure from
international organisations on them to modernise their insolvency laws, they are
more likely to adopt a version of the Model Law that signals their commitment
to international norms (such as broadly agreeing to give effect to the recognition
of foreign insolvency proceedings). At the same time, they impose more
modifications, carve-outs, or exceptions to give effect to path dependency.
These deviations limit the accessible, quick, and predictable outcomes of cases
involving relief in the country concerning cross-border insolvency. Thus, there
are limits to convergence due to choices of the jurisdictions that are determined
to signal their intentions to the international community.
We contribute to the existing literature on the following academic debates in
the following ways. First, drawing from political science and law, there exists a
line of literature that explains factors in harmonization of international financial
architecture, by emphasising the role of domestic regulatory preferences.33 For
example, in the context of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Walter argues that
the convergence to G-7 international financial standards in a number of Asian
states is a function of domestic politics.34 However, there is substantial “mock
compliance” where private-sector compliance costs are high and third party
monitoring costs are low in the areas of corporate governance.35 Our research
suggests the regulatory preferences involved in the signalling effect of adopting
the Model Law remains significant in Asia-Pacific.

31

Guide, supra note 15, at 31, ¶ 42.
See Irit Mevorach, Modified Universalism as Customary International Law, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1403,
1405 (2018) (discussing the Model Law and the evolving norm of “modified universalism”). However, the
author concedes that the status of the principle is “somewhat amorphous.” Id. at 1405. See also IRIT MEVORACH,
THE FUTURE OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW: OVERCOMING BIASES AND CLOSING GAPS (Oxford
University Press, 2018).
33
See also DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Eric Helleiner & Jonathan Kirshner eds., Cornell University Press, 2007).
See generally ANDREW WALTER, GOVERNING FINANCE: EAST ASIA’S ADOPTION OF INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS (Eric Helleiner & Jonathan Kirshner eds., Cornell Univ. Press, 2008).
34
WALTER, supra note 33, at 3.
35
Id.
32
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Second, we seek to extend the scope of the comparative study of crossborder insolvency and restructuring law to see how the initial choices of
territorialist approaches can have lasting effects, demonstrating the limits of
harmonization efforts.
Further, our study is relevant to Asian and other jurisdictions, such as China,
where debates are taking place as to whether to adopt the Model Law.36 Our
study is particularly timely given the fact that UNCITRAL has felt the need to
promulgate a supplemental Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of
Insolvency-Related Judgments.37 The lessons learned from the experience of the
Model Law implementation will be relevant to the other supplemental Model
Laws.
The rest of the Article is divided as follows. Section I explains the
background and judicial approaches towards cross-border insolvency that lead
to the enactment of the Model Law. Section I then explains how the Model Laws
have been enacted and interpreted in four jurisdictions in the Asia-Pacific,
highlighting the key issues of divergence. Section II explains the reasons for the
divergence in the implementation strategies. The Article finally concludes with
implications for UNCITRAL.
I.

DIVERGENCE OF ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE MODEL LAW
IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

A. Model Law and Existing Insolvency Framework in the Asia Pacific Region
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Model Law is “soft law” and states are

36
See, e.g., Rebecca Parry and Nan Gao, The Future Direction of China’s Cross-Border Insolvency Laws,
Related Issues and Potential Problems, 27 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 5–31 (2018).
37
See G.A. Res. A/RES/52/158, Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related
Judgments with Guide to Enactment of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (April
2019), https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/mlij [hereinafter “Judgments Model Law”].
UNCITRAL has noted that according to the UK Supreme Court in Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, long-standing
common-law rules for the recognition of foreign insolvency judgments remained undisturbed by the UK’s
adoption of the Model Law. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 (on appeal from [2010]
EWCA Civ 895 and [2011] EWCA Civ 97). The case brought to light problems of a global nature which, as the
Court noted, the Model Law did not provide an explicit solution. This led to significant uncertainty and might
have a chilling effect on the prospects of the Model Law gaining international acceptance. Therefore,
UNCITRAL considered it to be an opportune time to tackle the recognition and enforcement of these types of
judgements. See U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Recognition and enforcement of
foreign insolvency-derived judgements, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.126 (Oct. 6, 2014); and U.N. GAOR,
46th Sess., Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Background information on topics comprising the current
mandate of Working Group V and topics for future work, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.117 (Oct. 8, 2013).
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free to implement the Model Law in the way that they deem fit, including
determining how the Model Law fits into the states’ domestic insolvency
framework. Article 7 of the Model Law suggests that the Model Laws are only
intended to provide threshold levels of assistance and that states are free to
supplement them by providing additional assistance to a foreign insolvency
representative. 38 In its Guide, UNCITRAL explains that the purpose of the
Model Law is not to displace provisions in national legislation to the extent that
they provide assistance that is additional to, or different from, the type of
assistance dealt with in the Model Law.39
1. What Happened in Australia and Singapore?
Australia was one of the early adopters of the Model Law, which
supplements common law and the existing aid and auxiliary provisions in the
Corporations Act 2001.40
The Cross-Border Insolvency Act of 2008 was the legislation that
implemented the Model Law, with suitable modifications to take into account
local conditions. 41 This Act was promoted on the basis that Australia’s
implementation of the Model Law would support development of a wellunderstood, uniform, internationally recognized framework for administering
cross-border insolvencies. While Australia already had some laws dealing with
cross-border insolvency cases, they were not well-suited to dealing with the
manifold consequences and complexities of cross-border insolvencies. 42 An
international model law was “more likely to attract support and cooperation from
other countries than the current mechanisms of the law which have been adopted
unilaterally.”43
The responsible body in Australia, the Treasury, as part of the Corporate
Law Economic Review Program (CLERP) considered the possibility of having
38

Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 7.
Guide, supra note 15, at 53, ¶ 105.
40
Corporations Act 2001, (ACT) s 580–581 (Austl.).
41
Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 (Austl.). Australian cross-border insolvency law has been
comprehensively covered by Professor Rosalind Mason in a series of scholarly articles. See, e.g., Rosalind
Mason, Cross-border Insolvency and Legal Transnationalisation, 21 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 105 (2012);
Cross-Border Insolvency Bill 2007: The UNCITRCAL Model Law Enters the Parliamentary Stage Yet Australia
Still Awaits the Final Act, 15 INSOLVENCY L. J. 212 (2007); Local proceedings in a Multi-State Liquidation: Issues
of Jurisdiction, 30 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 145 (2006); see also, Anil Hargovan, The Cross-Border Insolvency
Act 2008 (Cth) – Issues and Implications, 22 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 188 (2008).
42
See Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) Proposals for Reform Paper No 8: CrossBorder Insolvency: Promoting International Cooperation and Coordination (Cth) 2002, at 14 (Austl.).
43
Id.
39
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a single comprehensive Cross Border Insolvency Regime. However, the
Treasury (which is the Australian Government department responsible for the
economic policy, fiscal policy and market regulation) suggested enacting the
Model Law as a standalone statute, albeit making appropriate adjustments to
other insolvency law provisions. The Treasury acknowledged the advantages of
having the whole law in the one place but adopted the view that these
considerations were outweighed by other factors.44 For instance, the Model Law
was styled and arranged somewhat differently than other Australian statutes and
therefore did not dove-tail easily with existing Acts. The proposed new law
would be drafted as a coherent whole and therefore would be more useful to the
courts. It was also suggested that a separate standalone statute would have
greater international visibility.
Singapore adopted its version of the Model Law based on the 2016 Report
of the Committee on Singapore as an International Centre for Debt
Restructuring45 and the 2013 Insolvency Law Review Committee Report.46 The
2016 Report referenced the provision of a clear and internationally recognized
framework for resolving cross-border insolvencies 47 while the 2013 Report
referred to a firmer and more predictable platform for cross-border cooperation
in insolvency matters. The 2013 Report said that the:
[I]ncreased certainty and cooperation will in many cases lead to a
greater predictability of process and outcome, which . . . [often may]
help lower the risks and costs of international financing, reduce the
overall cost of insolvency litigation, and reduce the overall costs of
obtaining recoveries or dividends from the cross-border insolvency
process. It may also influence foreign investment in Singapore
favourably.48

The 2016 Report further referred to the fact that the Model Law was the
international benchmark and there was (then) no multilateral convention on
cross-border insolvency that could appropriately be adopted for this purpose.49
44
See generally Gerard McCormack and Anil Hargovan, Australia and International Insolvency
Paradigm, 37 SYDNEY L. REV. 389 (2015).
45
COMMITTEE TO STRENGTHEN SINGAPORE AS AN INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEBT RESTRUCTURING,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE (MINISTRY OF LAW) (2016), https://app.mlaw.gov.sg/files/news/publicconsultations/2016/04/Final%20DR%20Report.pdf.
46
2013 Report, supra, note 8.
47
2016 Report, supra, note 45, at para. 3.27.
48
2013 Report, supra note 8, at 239.
49
The Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments was not yet
promulgated in 2016; it was promulgated in 2018. See G.A. Res. A/RES/52/158, Model Law on Recognition
and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments with Guide to Enactment of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (April 2019), https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/mlij.
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The Model Law’s enactment was a prominent and outward-facing international
milestone even though the Singapore courts have in recent years been
particularly active in pushing forward the boundaries of judicial cooperation in
cross-border insolvencies and restructurings.50

2. What happened in Korea and Japan?
Prior to the enactment of their Model Law legislation, Korea and Japan each
were seen as taking a territorialist approach towards cross-border insolvency.
Since the relevant legislation came into force, there has been a move towards a
more modified universalist approach. However, as seen in the next Section,
significant divergences still exist in the implementation and judicial
interpretation.
In Korea, prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the insolvency
legislation which applied (the Corporate Reorganization Act, the Composition
Act, and the Bankruptcy Act) was not significant and there were hardly any
reorganisation proceedings.51 Financial institutions lent readily to the chaebols
to finance risky projects without proper due diligence, due to the belief that the
chaebols were too big to fail.52 However, when the Asian financial crisis struck
in 1997, many companies, including financial institutions, were badly hit and
applied for judicial proceedings to restructure.53 The crisis demonstrated that the
non-performing loans on the books of the financial institutions were highly
toxic, almost leading to the institutions’ destruction. As a result, many
international organisations, including the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank, put pressure on Korea to implement wholesale insolvency
reforms.54 The Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Bill (DRBA) was tabled

50
E.g., Re Opti-Medix Ltd, [2016] SGHC 108 (Sing.), where the court acknowledged that in cross-border
insolvency, there has been a general movement away from the traditional, territorial focus on the interests of the
local creditors, towards recognition that universal cooperation between jurisdictions was a necessary part of the
contemporary world. As a consequence of a greater sensitivity for universalist notions in insolvency, there was
also a greater readiness to go beyond traditional bases for recognising foreign insolvency proceedings. See also
another decision of the Singapore High Court in Re Gulf Pacific Shipping Ltd, [2016] SGHC 287 (Sing.).
51
See Soogeun Oh, An Overview of the New Korean Insolvency Law, 16 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
5 art. 5, tbl. 1 (2007) (Table 1 setting out the proceedings brought 1990 to 1997 which averages less than eighty
a year).
52
See Jong-Wha Lee, “Twenty Years after the Financial Crisis in the Republic of Korea,” ADB, Working
Paper No. 790 (Nov. 2017), available at https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/378801/adbiwp790.pdf.
53
Id. (Table 1 showing that the cases for reorganisation increased sharply in 1997 and 1998 to 132 and
148, respectively).
54
TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, Korea: Legal Restructuring of the Market and State,
in BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS, 211–246 (Stanford Univ. Press, 2009).
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before the National Assembly in 2003 and 2004, but in part due to international
pressure, passed in 2005, with an effective date of March 1, 2006.55 The DRBA
became the comprehensive integrated legislation on insolvency and replaced the
Corporate Reorganization Act,56 Composition Act,57 and Bankruptcy Act.58
Commentators59 and the Korean Supreme Court60 described the Corporate
Reorganization Act (which was repealed by the DRBA) as distinctly territorial.
For example, Article 4 of the Corporate Reorganization Act provided that
reorganization proceedings commenced in a foreign country have no effect on
property in Korea.61
Oh has summarized the effect of the former Korean legislation:
The corporate reorganization procedure and the bankruptcy procedure
are effective on property in Korea ([Bankruptcy Act] Art. 3,
[Corporate Reorganization Act)] Art. 6). Any foreign judgment on
bankruptcy and any corporate reorganization procedure commenced
by a foreign court cannot be applied to properties placed in Korea
([Bankruptcy Act] Art. 3, [Corporate Reorganization Act)] Art. 6.62

With the onset of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, various international
organisations including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, put
pressure on Korea to implement wholesale insolvency reforms, including the
automatic stay upon application for commencement of insolvency
proceedings. 63 As part of the reform, Part V of DRBA included provisions
providing for the recognition and support of foreign insolvency cases in Korean
courts, Korean insolvency proceedings in foreign courts, and appointment of an
international administrator or trustee.64
However, instead of closely following the language of the Model Law, the
DRBA used its own wording and, in the process, made a number of

55

See id.
Corporate Reorganization Act, enacted December 12, 1962 by Act No. 1214 (S. Kor.).
57
Composition Act, enacted January 20, 1962 by Act No. 997 (S. Kor).
58
Bankruptcy Act, enacted January 12, 1962 by Act No. 998 (S. Kor).
59
See id.
60
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Ma1600, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Ministry of
Government Legislation https://www.scourt.go.kr/eng/supreme/decisions/NewDecisionsView.work?seq=559&
pageIndex=1&mode=6&searchWord= (visited Jan. 1, 2019).
61
Id.
62
Soogeun Oh, “Insolvency Law in Korea” in ROMAN TOMASIC, INSOLVENCY LAW IN EAST ASIA 91
(Routledge 2016) (2006).
63
HALLIDAY AND CARRUTHERS, supra note 54.
64
Id.
56
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modifications to the Model Law, which are detailed in the Section below. These
key modifications include: (1) the lack of an automatic stay with the recognition
of foreign bankruptcy proceedings found in Article 20 of the Model Law, (2)
modifying the provisions relating to judicial communication and cooperation in
Article 25 of the Model Law; and (3) modifying the hotchpot rule’s application
in Article 32 of the Model Law. However, developments in the last five years
indicate that issues relating to (2) and (3) may be more apparent than real.65
Japan’s enactment of the Law on Recognition of and Assistance for Foreign
Insolvency Proceedings (Recognition Law) occurred in the wake of wideranging corporate and personal insolvency reforms following a prolonged
recession in the 1990s.66 In 1996, a Bankruptcy Law Committee was set up in
the Legislative Council to amend the laws relating to civil rehabilitation
proceedings for small and medium size enterprises dealing with personal
insolvency and created a new legal framework for cross-border insolvency. The
Recognition Law, which was based on the Model Law, was tabled in 2000. The
other important reform was the Corporate Reorganization Law which was
amended shortly thereafter in 2002 and took effect in 2003. Prior to the
Recognition Law, Japanese insolvency laws were described as “distinctly
territorial.”67 The administrator of Japan’s proceedings had no right to manage
and dispose of the debtor company’s assets located in a foreign country and vice
versa. 68 While Matsushita pointed out that Japanese courts modify the strict
territorial principle in cases where the purpose of the foreign administrator was
to preserve the debtor company’s assets located in Japan, any such modifications
are “modest.”69 Bhala commented that even with the apparent relaxation of the
strict territorialist principle, the Japanese courts only allow the foreign trustee to
preserve the assets in Japan where there is no Japanese creditor seeking to attach
the same assets.70
The Recognition Law was described as being ahead of its time when enacted
since there were few jurisdictions which had enacted the Model Law in 2000.71

65

See discussion, infra Section I (B).
For Japan, see Stacey Steele, Insolvency Law in Japan, in INSOLVENCY LAW IN EAST ASIA 13 (Roman
Tomasic ed., Ashgate Publishing 2006). See generally Yamamoto, supra note 21; Junichi Matsushita,
Comprehensive Reform of Japanese Personal Insolvency Law, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 555 (2006).
67
Raj Bhala, International Dimensions of Japanese Insolvency Law, in 19 MONETARY AND ECON. STUD.
131, 166 (2001).
68
Id. at 162.
69
Junichi Matsushita, Present and Future Status of Japanese International Insolvency Law, 33 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 71, 75–77 (1998).
70
Bhala, supra note 67, at 163.
71
See references to notes 10 and 11 in Sohsuke Takahashi, The Reality of the Japanese Legal System for
66
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While Japan based its legislation on the Model Law, it did not follow the
language of the Model Law strictly and made a number of modifications. With
striking similarity to Korea, the main differences between Japan’s Recognition
Law and the Model Law are: (1) the lack of an automatic stay and other
consequences (including the lack of automatic turning over of assets to the
insolvency representative) with the recognition of the foreign bankruptcy
proceedings; (2) modification of the provisions on judicial communication and
cooperation; and (3) the priority given to local proceedings. The key areas of
divergence are discussed below.
B. Key Issues and Divergence in the Application of Model Law
In this Section, we highlight the key issues arising under the Model Law and
how states diverge in the Model Law’s enactment and interpretation. We argue
that due to the differences in the adoption of the Model Law, states enacting the
Model Law have signaled the recognition of giving effect to foreign insolvency
proceedings. However, differences in the details raise the broader question of
whether the objectives of certainty and predictability have been achieved. The
details differ in the following ways: (1) giving greater leeway for the domestic
court to refuse recognition of the foreign proceedings; (2) not implementing
specific provisions of the Model Law on the ground that the local law is unsettled
or unclear or that there is no equivalent; and (3) limiting the effects of
recognition.
1. Reciprocity and Public Policy Exception
A central issue in the context of the Model Law is the possibility of a
reciprocity requirement—in other words, Country X should recognize foreign
proceedings in Country Y only if Country Y recognizes proceedings from
Country X. Reciprocity conditions are part of the insolvency laws in some
countries. A glaring example is Article 5 of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy
Law. 72 But such conditions limit the effectiveness of the Model Law and
adversely affect the capacity of a country to project itself as outward facing and
progressive. A reciprocity requirement might be applied by a court on an ad hoc

Cross-Border Insolvency: Driven by Fear of Universalism (Mar. 14, 2011) (unpublished comment) (on file with
International Insolvency Institute). Only Japan, South Africa, and Mexico adopted the Model Law in 2000. No
other country had adopted the Model Law prior to 2000. See STATUS: UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCY, https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/insolvency/modellaw/cross-border_insolvency/status
(last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
72
See generally Emily Lee, Problems of Judicial Recognition and Enforcement in Cross-Border
Insolvency Matters Between Hong Kong and Mainland China, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 439 (2015).
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basis when considering the recognition of foreign proceedings—as the approach
is in China.73 Alternatively, a reciprocity requirement might be carried out by a
government agency tasked with designating certain countries as having fulfilled
reciprocity conditions.74
The majority of the states that have adopted the Model Law have not insisted
on the reciprocity requirement.75 When Singapore considered the Model Law’s
adoption, the arguments for and against imposing a reciprocity requirement were
hotly debated. The Insolvency Law Review Committee noted that many of the
advantages flowing from the Model Law, such as “equality of treatment for local
creditors, the ease of recovering assets from foreign jurisdictions and more
efficient treatment of international insolvencies involving local businesses may
come only if other countries also enact the Model Law or an equivalent
thereof.” 76 The Committee noted that the Model Law had not yet achieved
widespread international adoption. Nevertheless, the Committee decided not to
recommend any reciprocity obligation 77 and its reasons for adopting this
viewpoint seem sound.
While the consensus among a majority of states is that reciprocity is
unnecessary, the Model Law contains certain elements that protect local
creditors and local public policy. In relation to local public policy, there is
greater divergence in the implementation of the public policy rider and
consequently, the courts’ interpretation thereof. Under the Model Law, a local
court may refuse assistance in relation to foreign insolvency proceedings where
assistance would be “manifestly contrary to the public policy” of the local
state.78 The use of the word ‘manifestly,’ however, suggests that “the public
policy exception should be interpreted restrictively” and only invoked where a
case involves matters “considered to be of fundamental importance.”79 There are
suggestions in the English case—Cherkasov v. Olegovich, the Official Receiver
73
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Bankruptcy Law), Aug. 27, 2006,
effective June 1, 2007 (China).
74
South Africa took this approach when adopting the Model Law, but in fact, no countries have been so
designated. Consequently, the Model Law is a dead letter as far as South Africa is concerned. See Cross-Border
Insolvency Act 42 of 2000 § 2 (S. Afr.). See generally Alastair Smith & Andre Boraine, Crossing Borders into
South African Insolvency Law: From the Roman-Dutch Jurists to the UNCITRAL Model Law, 10 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 135 (2002).
75
For a discussion of the countries that have versions of the reciprocity requirement, such as South Africa,
Mexico and Romania, see generally Keith D. Yamauchi, Should Reciprocity be Part of the UNCITRAL Model
Cross-Border Insolvency Law, 16 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 145 (2007).
76
2013 Report, supra note 8, at 236.
77
2013 Report, supra note 8, at 236–38.
78
Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 6.
79
FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 462.
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of Dalnyaya Step LLC80—that the public policy exception may be used in cases
where there is a breach of natural justice or procedural fairness. In Cherkasov, it
was argued that Russian foreign insolvency proceedings were part of an assetstripping exercise by instrumentalities of the Russian State to sideline political
opponents.81 The Cherkasov court states: “It is true that Article 6 is to be read
restrictively and will only be relevant in a very small number of cases. But this
case falls clearly within that small class.” 82 The mere fact that the foreign law’s
priorities in liquidating the company differ from English law is not sufficient to
invoke English public policy.83
After Australia adopted Article 6 of the Model Law, the provision was
unsuccessfully invoked in Re Legend International Holdings84 to try and avoid
recognition of a U.S. chapter 11 reorganisation. The Legend court pointed out
that courts are “slow” to invoke public policy.85
Other states implemented Article 6 slightly differently. Singapore adopted
Article 6 of the Model Law but without the word “manifestly.” Japan 86 and
South Korea’s 87 legislative provisions also did not include the word
“manifestly.” This appears to allow the courts in these states more room to avoid
giving effect to foreign insolvency proceedings. For example, Re Zetta Jets Pte
Ltd., the Singapore High Court held that:
This would seem to mean that recognition may be denied if recognition
is merely contrary to public policy, without being manifestly
so . . . . What flows from the omission being deliberate is that the
standard of exclusion on public policy grounds in Singapore is lower

80

Re Dalnyaya Step LLC [2017] EWHC (Ch) 756 [22]–[30] (Eng.).
Id. at [24].
82
Id. at [82]; UNCITRAL itself has recognized the “notion of public policy is grounded in national law
and may differ from State to State[.]”; Guide, supra note 15, at ¶ 101.
83
Re Agrokor [2017] EWHC (Ch) 2791, [131] (Eng.).
84
Indian Farmers Fertiliser Coop. Ltd. and Kisan Int’l Trading FZE v Legend Int’l Holdings Inc. [ARBN
120 855 352] [2016] VSC 308.
85
Id. at [52].
86
Article 21(3) of the Japanese Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency Proceedings
(2001) allows a court to refuse recognition of a foreign proceeding considered to be contrary to the public order
or good public morals in Japan. See SHIN-ICHIRO ABE, Japan, in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY
ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, 324 (Look Chan Ho ed., Globe Law and Business 4th ed. 2017). There is no
mention of “manifestly” in the Japanese legislation adopting the Model Law.
87
See DRBA, supra note 11, art. 632(2) (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Ministry of Government
Legislation, http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korLawEng?pstSeq=52645 (last visited Oct. 11, 2019) (providing
that the court may dismiss the petition for recognition if the foreign bankruptcy proceeding is contrary to the
public policy of the Republic of Korea); CHIYONG RIM, South Korea, in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, 585 (Look Chan Ho ed., Globe Law and Business 4th ed. 2017).
81
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than that in jurisdictions where the Model Law has been enacted
unmodified.88

In Zetta, the court held that foreign insolvency proceedings instituted in the
breach of an injunction order granted in Singapore could not be recognized in
Singapore on the ground that it was contrary to public policy.
In addition to Article 6, other provisions exist in the Model Law that may be
utilised to reflect public policy choices such as protecting local creditors and
enforcing or denying the enforcement of foreign revenue debts. In particular,
Article 21(2) of the Model Law allows recognition of the foreign proceeding to
be modified, including in cases where the debtor’s property is handed over to
the foreign representative.89 The court needs to be satisfied that local creditors
are “adequately protected” and similarly, under Article 22(1), the court in
granting, modifying, or denying relief, must be satisfied that the interests of
creditors and other interested persons are adequately protected.90 However, the
Model Law does not define “local creditors” and “adequate protection” and are
left to the courts’ interpretation. In the Australian case, Akers v Deputy
Commissioner of Taxation, the Full Federal Court held that Articles 21 and 22
prevented the assets from being handed over for distribution in the foreign main
proceeding unless the local creditor (in this case, the Australian tax authorities)
was able to recover the amount equal to the pari passu claim of the taxation debt
as an unsecured creditor in the foreign main proceeding. 91 Under the relevant
foreign law, the Australian foreign revenue debt could not be proven in the main
proceedings.92 This order created a form of ‘mini-Australian liquidation,’ which
enables the tax authorities to recover such amounts as if the debtor wound up in
Australia.93
In Japan, in a departure from Article 21(2) of the Model Law, Article 31 of
the Recognition Law provides that before the court allows the turning over of
assets to a foreign country, the court must be satisfied that ‘there is no likelihood
of the interests of creditors in Japan being unreasonably prejudiced.’ 94 This
gives rise to two possible interpretations: the first, argued by Yamatomo, means

88

Re Zetta Jets Pte Ltd. [2018] SGHC [21], [23] (Sing.).
Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 21(2).
90
Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 22(1).
91
Akers v Deputy Comm’r of Taxation [2014] FCAFC 57 [41] (Austl.).
92
Id.
93
Gerard McCormack & Anil Hargovan, supra note 44, at 395–96.
94
Kent Anderson, Testing the Model Soft Law Approach to International Harmonisation: A Case-Study
Examining the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 23 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2004)
(quoting Recognition Law, supra note 10, at art. 31(2)); see ABE, supra note 86, at 328.
89
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that the provision is intended to protect the local creditors in the same way as
the Model Law.95 An alternative interpretation raised by Anderson is that such
an approach (which refers to unreasonable prejudice) attracts the risk that courts
may take into account the relative positions of the local creditors in the foreign
proceedings and not grant the order of turning over the assets to the foreign
representative because the local creditors would have fared better in local
proceedings.96 In this regard, it is noted that Article 35 of the Recognition Law
requires the permission of the court before the debtor’s assets can be turned over
to the foreign representative (which is not dissimilar to the Model Law97 where
such consequences may occur upon recognition of foreign non-main
proceedings).
Article 6, as well as Article 21(2), are examples where the local adoption of
these provisions gives rise to uncertainty and lack of predictability of outcomes
to foreign representatives seeking recognition or assistance.
2. Proceedings to Which the Model Law Applies
The Model Law applies to “collective judicial or administrative proceeding
in a foreign state, including an interim proceeding, pursuant to a law relating to
insolvency in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject
to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or
liquidation[.]”98 The so-called “court” may not, strictly speaking, be a court as
described since the Model Law refers to a judicial or other authority that can
control or supervise proceedings.99
The definition of collective insolvency proceedings covers both “debtor-inpossession” restructuring regimes such as chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code of 1978 and manager-displacing regimes like voluntary administration in
Australia and judicial management in Singapore.100
95

Yamamoto, supra note 21, at 87.
See Anderson, supra note 94, at 12, citing Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in
General Default: Chapter 15, the ALI Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 24–
26 (2002). See generally Lionel Meehan, Cross Border Insolvency Law: Reform and Recent Developments in
Light of the JAL Corporate Reorganisation Filing, 22 J. BANKING FIN. L. PRAC. 40, 43–44, 48 (2011) (arguing
that this issue is largely untested in Japan).
97
Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 21(1)(e).
98
Id. at art. 2(a); see Re Chow Cho Poon (Private) Ltd [2011] NSWSC 35 (Austl.).
99
Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 2(e).
100
In Re 19 Entm’t Ltd. [2016] EWHC 1545 (Ch) (Eng.), U.S. chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganisation
proceedings were recognized in the UK under the Model Law and CBIR as relevant foreign proceedings. It has
also been held in Re New Paragon, that a creditors’ voluntary liquidation in Hong Kong was entitled to
recognition in the U.K. under the Model Law and CBIR. Re New Paragon Inv. Ltd. [2012] BCC 371 (Eng.) The
96
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At least two issues exist with the general definition, and implementing states
tweaked the basic Model Law definition in different ways. There are issues
surrounding “non-insolvency” winding up. The laws in many states contain
provisions under which the affairs of a company may be wound up, assets
distributed, and legal existence brought to an end even though the company may
not be insolvent. The winding up may be ordered on general public interest
grounds, or on the basis that it is just and equitable. For example, this might
happen where the company is a small, tightly-knit company and there are
squabbles between the company’s principals.
Australia has held that a winding-up order based on the just and equitable
ground can be regarded as a foreign proceeding within the Model Law because
the power to wind up under this ground can be seen as part of a law relating to
insolvency.101 Similarly, Australia has held that members’ voluntary windingup, essentially a solvent liquidation, gives appropriate assistance under the U.S.
version of the Model Law, chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.102
One might justify these decisions on the basis of a foreign law under which
a winding up is ordered and characterized. Such characterization occurs even
though the particular provisions under which winding up is ordered are not
necessarily confined only to insolvency situations.103
Second, different decisions may owe something to the diverging ways in
which states adopted the Model Law. For instance, Singapore and Australia
adopted schemes of arrangement that have been used extensively in recent years
as debt restructuring tools.104 The schemes of arrangement need approval from
a majority representing seventy-five percent in value of concerned members or
creditors voting at relevant class meetings.105 There are essentially three stages
court held that a “‘foreign proceeding’ included an extra-judicial proceeding or an administrative proceeding
provided it related to liquidation.” Id.
101
Poon, supra note 98, at ¶ 51. It has been held however, in the UK in Re Sturgeon Central Asia Balanced
Fund Ltd (In Liquidation) [2020] EWHC 123 (Ch) that the foreign proceedings in respect of which recognition
was sought had to relate to the resolution of the debtor's insolvency or financial distress. Therefore, recognition
was not available to a solvent company that was subject to just and equitable winding-up in another country.
102
See In re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R. 266 (D. Nev. 2009).
103
See Guide, supra note 15, at ¶ 48 (“Where a proceeding serves several purposes, including the winding
up of a solvent entity, it falls [within] the Model Law only if the debtor is insolvent or in severe financial
distress”); Guide, supra note 15, at ¶ 71.
104
Jason Harris, Class warfare in debt restructuring: Does Australia Need Cross-class Cram Down for
Creditors’ Schemes of Arrangement?, 36 U. OF QUEENSLAND L. J. 73 (2017). See generally CHRISTIAN
PILKINGTON, SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT IN CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING (Sweet & Maxwell 2d ed. 2017);
GEOFF O’DEA ET AL., SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT: LAW AND PRACTICE (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012); JENNIFER
PAYNE, SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENT: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014).
105
See id.
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to the process: (1) an initial court application; (2) a subsequent court application;
and (3) court approval for the scheme. These separate stages and the necessity
of obtaining court approval are why the scheme procedure was costly,
cumbersome, and little used. While the separate stages remain, judicial decisions
have smoothed over some of the potential pitfalls such as disagreements over
class composition and the need for multiple classes.106
Schemes are not an insolvency procedure per se. Rather, they are a corporate
law procedure. Therefore, they do not necessarily carry any insolvency stigma.
In Japan, Article 2 of the Model Law, as implemented in the Japanese
legislation, defines ‘foreign insolvency proceedings’ as proceedings outside
Japan that correspond or are equivalent to, among others, a bankruptcy
proceeding, a civil rehabilitation proceeding, and a corporate reorganisation
proceeding.107 In other words, proceedings outside Japan are equivalent to those
under the Japanese insolvency laws. A Japanese commentator argues that what
amounts to an equivalent proceeding under Japanese insolvency law would be
the subject of judicial interpretation, as the Japanese legislation does not explain
the specific characteristics of foreign insolvency law.108 In Korea, Article 628 of
the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (DRBA), which incorporates
Article 2 of the Model Law, specifically refers to, among others, rehabilitation,
bankruptcy, and other similar proceedings for which petitions are filed with a
foreign court (including the corresponding authorities). 109 Schemes of
arrangement are likely to be regarded as proceedings similar to rehabilitation
proceedings.
3. Treatment of Foreign Creditors
Article 13 of the Model Law provides that foreign creditors have the same
rights as domestic creditors to institute and participate in insolvency
proceedings. The common law does not discriminate on its face against foreign
creditors. In Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation v Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors (of Navigator Holdings Plc),110 Lord Hoffmann observed:
106
Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573, 583 (a scheme class confined to those
“persons whose rights are not so dissimilar to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to
their common interest.”); see generally Harris, supra note 87.
107
Hideyuki Sakai & C. Christian Jacobson, Cross-Border Insolvency – Japan, INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY INSTITUTE (2001), https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/11-_CROSS%20BORDER%20
INSOLVENCY-Japan.pdf.
108
See also ABE, supra note 86, at 322–33.
109
See also RIM, supra note 87, at 582–83.
110
Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc,
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“The English common law has traditionally taken the view that fairness between
creditors requires that, ideally, bankruptcy proceedings should have universal
application. There should be a single bankruptcy in which all creditors are
entitled and required to prove.”111
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to make this point expressly since it provides
clarity and transparency for foreign creditors and insolvency representatives.
There is also a general provision in the Model Law that foreign creditors should
not be ranked lower than the class of general non-preference domestic claims.112
However, it may be that foreign creditors, such as foreign preferential
creditors, find that their claims do not have the same status in the foreign forum
as they do in their home country and many states exclude foreign revenue claims
totally from recognition in insolvency proceedings. Indeed, UNCITRAL, in the
Guide, acknowledges national sensitivities in this regard by giving states the
leeway to continue the exclusion of foreign revenue claims. 113 The U.S. 114 ,
Australia115 and Singapore have made use of this ‘opt-out.’ They have not used
the Model Law as an opportunity to amend general domestic law and make
foreign tax claims enforceable.
In Japan, while Article 13 of the Model Law is enacted in Japanese
legislation,116 the legislation does not specifically address the issue of foreign

[2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 (appeal from The Isle of Man).
111
Id. at ¶ 16.
112
Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 13(2).
113
Guide, supra note 15, at ¶ 118–20. See the discussion in FLETCHER, supra note 27, at 477.
114
11 U.S.C. § 1513(b)(2)(B) (2019) provides that the admissibility and priority of a foreign tax claim is
governed by any applicable tax treaty of the U.S., under the conditions and circumstances specified therein. The
implementation of the Model Law in the U.S. does not change U.S. law on the inadmissibility of foreign revenue
claims. Some of the reasons for the exclusion were articulated in British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161,
1165 (9th Cir. 1979). It was suggested that requiring countries to enforce foreign tax claims would require some
analysis of the tax claim, and could be embarrassing to the foreign State. U.S. courts may not be able to
understand and evaluate foreign tax claims and enforcing such claims would ‘have the effect of furthering the
governmental interests of a foreign country, something which our courts customarily refuse to do’. For a general
discussion see generally Jonathan M. Weiss, Tax Claims in Transnational Insolvencies: A “Revenue Rule”
Approach, 30 VA. TAX REV. 261 (2010).
115
Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 s 12 (Austl.) (From Dec. 1, 2012, however the position is more
nuanced following Australia’s ratification of the OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in
Tax Matters. The Australian Commissioner of Taxation is obliged to assist in the recovery of tax claims from a
large number of foreign jurisdictions that are party to this Convention and, subject to certain conditions, the
Commissioner is empowered to recover the foreign tax claim as if it were its own.); see also AUSTRALIAN
TAXATION OFFICE, PRACTICE STATEMENT LAW ADMINISTRATION 2011/13 CROSS BORDER RECOVERY OF
TAXATION DEBTS (2011).
116
See Recognition Law, supra note 10, at art. 3; ABE, supra note 86, at 325.
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tax and social security claims.117 The position is similar to Korea’s position,
where foreign and domestic creditors are able to commence and participate in
the local proceedings, but the implementing legislation is silent on foreign tax
and social security claims.118 This gives rise to some uncertainty for foreign
creditors seeking to commence or participate in Korean and Japanese insolvency
proceedings.
Certainly, foreign creditors are often disadvantaged by the opening of
insolvency proceedings. These proceedings may be taking place according to a
foreign procedure and in an unfamiliar language. Foreign creditors may not be
aware of the time limits for lodging claims, or the proofs that must be submitted.
An insolvency proceeding may require a translation of the claim into one of the
official languages of the state where the proceedings have been opened, as well
as the services of a foreign lawyer or other professional, and costs may render it
uneconomical to submit a claim. The European Commission notes: “Due to high
costs, creditors may choose to forgo a debt, especially when it involves a small
amount of money. This problem mainly affects small and medium-sized
businesses as well as private individuals.”119
Article 14 of the Model Law contains certain concrete measures to alleviate
the disadvantage that foreign-based creditors may suffer in practice. 120 They
must be notified individually of the proceedings, unless the court considers that
some other form of notification would be more appropriate, or where the
notification to local creditors is by advertisement of something equivalent.121
When notice of a right to lodge a claim is given to foreign creditors, the
notification must indicate a reasonable time period for filing claims and set out
a place for filing.122 These provisions are rather limited, however, and certainly
they do not establish a comprehensive procedural framework. 123

117

See ABE, supra note 86, at 325.
See RIM, supra note 87, at 588.
119
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic
and Social Committee on the Application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on
Insolvency Proceedings, at 17, COM (2012) 743 final (Dec. 12, 2012).
120
Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 14.
121
Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 14(2).
122
Model Law, supra note 1, at art. 14(3).
123
For a general analysis of the distinctions between the European Insolvency Regulation and the
UNCITRAL Model Law and drawing attention to the more limited provisions of the latter see Reinhard Bork,
‘The European Insolvency Regulation and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross‐Border Insolvency’ (2017) 26
International Law Review 246. See also European Insolvency Regulation (Regulation 2015/848) Articles 53–55
on treatment of foreign creditors, duty to inform creditors, and procedure for lodgement of claims.
118
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4. Extent of Application of Foreign Law
A controversial aspect of the Model Law is what sort of relief may be
available to a foreign insolvency representative, and whether this includes the
application of provisions of the relevant foreign law—an extra-territorial
application of the foreign law in the recognizing state. The Model Law is
somewhat ambiguous in Article 21(1)(g) on the granting of any additional relief
that may be available under the laws of the recognizing state. This provision is
more or less faithfully reproduced in some implementing states including
Singapore, which refers to the grant of any additional relief that may be available
to a Singapore insolvency officeholder.124
Transactional avoidance is dealt with in Article 23 of the Model Law, which
gives a foreign representative standing to invoke local laws on transactional
avoidance. Singapore125 and Australia126 have both implemented Article 23 in
this way.
The Australian and Singaporean versions of the Model Law do not address
specifically whether foreign law may be applied to decide the appropriate form
of relief to grant to a foreign insolvency officeholder. Nevertheless, it seems to
limit the type of relief that may be available to an officeholder in local
proceedings, and this approach appears to exclude the application of foreign law.
Korea and Japan have not implemented Article 23 of the Model Law
explicitly, because the law on transaction avoidance is complicated and remains
unsettled in the two countries.127 Insofar as Article 21(1)(g) of the Model Law
concerns reliefs, in Korea, Article 636 of DRBA (which is based on Article 21
of the Model Law), the Supreme Court of South Korea held that recognition of
a foreign discharge must be based on the local laws of civil procedure.128 The
foreign discharge cannot be recognized by obtaining recognition and relief under
DRBA.129 In Japan, Article 26(1) of the Recognition Law allows for the court to
grant a “disposition” with regard to the debtor’s assets and business to give effect
124

Companies Act 2006, supra note 8, at art. 21(1)(g), sched. 10 (Sing.).
Id. at art. 23, sched. 10 (Sing.).
126
Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008 s 17 (Austl.).
127
See RIM, supra note 87; Yamamoto, supra note 21, at 88; ABE, supra note 86, at 328.
128
See MIN HAN, Recognition of Insolvency Effects of a Foreign Insolvency Proceeding: Focusing on the
Effect of Discharge, in TRADE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH HARMONIZATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 355 (Muruga
Perumal Ramaswamy & Joao Ribeiro eds., New Zealand Association for Comparative Law, 2015) (citing
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Ma1600, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.)).
129
While the judicial position in Japan is not clear, the prevailing scholarly view is that recognition of a
foreign discharge should be effected by recognition of a foreign judgment under the domestic law of Japan and
not by the legislation based on the Model Law. See id.
125
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to the recognition and assistance proceedings, but it is assumed that disposition
is limited to what is permitted under the civil or civil procedure code.130
In more recent developments, UNCITRAL has attributed its decision to
adopt a new Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of InsolvencyRelated Judgments to the chilling effect of Rubin v. Eurofinance SA and the 2010
Korean decision, Gohap.131 In Gohap, the Supreme Court of South Korea held
that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court order approving a rehabilitation plan, which
purported to discharge a Korean law-governed debt, could not be recognized
under the DRBA provisions relating to recognition of foreign insolvency
proceedings. 132 However, the discharge resulting from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court order could be recognized as an ordinary foreign judgment if the standard
conditions under Korean law for recognition of such judgments were satisfied.133
It remains to be seen, however, whether states will take the approach of: (1)
adopting a new corpus of rules on insolvency-related judgments, or (2) merely
clarifying that their existing Model Law implementation provisions allow the
recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments and the
application of foreign law. The new Model Law’s intention is not to replace
legislation in states that have previously enacted the Cross-Border Insolvency
Model Law or to limit that legislation’s application.134
5. Effects of Recognition and Automatic Stay
Article 20 of the Model Law provides for automatic effects upon recognition
of a foreign main proceeding, such as an automatic stay. While the common law
countries of Australia135 and Singapore136 have implemented Article 20, Japan
and Korea have not done so. In Japan, no distinction exists between foreign main
proceedings and foreign non-main proceedings. Japan’s version of the Model
Law gives the court discretion to grant relief upon or after issuing a recognition
130

See Recognition Law, supra note 10, at art. 26(1).
See UNCITRAL, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Recognition and enforcement of foreign
insolvency-related judgements: draft guide to enactment of the model law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.151,
at para. 2, note 1 (Sept. 20, 2017); Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 (on appeal from
[2010] EWCA Civ 895 and [2011] EWCA Civ 97).
132
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Ma1600, Mar. 25, 2010 (S. Kor.), translated in Korean Ministry of
Government Legislation https://www.scourt.go.kr/eng/supreme/decisions/NewDecisionsView.work?seq=559&
pageIndex=1&mode=6&searchWord= (last visited Jan. 1, 2019).
133
See Kwang Yun Suk, South Korea, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Asia, ASIAN
BUS. L. INST. (2017), https://abli.asia/Projects/Foreign-Judgments-Project.
134
See Judgments Model Law, supra note 37, at 3–4, preamble recital 2, art. X.
135
Cross-Border Insolvency Act 2008, s 16 (Austl.).
136
Companies Act, 2006, art. 20, sch. 10 (Sing.).
131

SMU Classification: Restricted
MCCORMACKWANPROOFS_4.30.20

84

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

5/3/2020 3:43 PM

[Vol. 36

order.137 Yamamoto notes the decision not to allow an automatic effect would
result in the recognising court prudently deciding on recognition that it would
delay the recognition process.138 However, Yamamoto argues that Japanese law
“permits the court to recognize a foreign non-main proceeding along the line of
the [M]odel [L]aw scheme, and, [furthermore], to stay a local proceeding based
on recognition of a foreign main proceeding under several conditions.”139
Similar to Japan, Korea has not adopted the automatic stay upon recognition
of the foreign bankruptcy proceedings.140 For relief to be obtained in connection
with the foreign bankruptcy proceeding, the foreign representative has to file a
petition for relief under Article 635 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy
Act (provisional relief prior to recognition of the foreign bankruptcy proceeding)
and/or Article 636 (relief granted upon such recognition).141 This reflects the
Korean position that an automatic stay does not follow a bankruptcy petition.142
The reliefs prior to recognition that can be applied for by the foreign insolvency
representative include the suspension of a lawsuit relating to the debtor’s
business or property, prohibition of suspension of compulsory execution, and
prohibition of repayment or disposition of the debtor’s property by the debtor.143
Soogeun Oh has argued that Korea departs from the automatic stay
provisions in the Model Law because the country aimed to ensure specialisation
of its courts in handling cross-border insolvencies. Thus, the foreign insolvency
representative must first apply to the Seoul Central District Court for
recognition, which has expertise on cross-border insolvency cases, before it can
apply to any other district court that has jurisdiction.144 In contrast, under Article
11 of the Model Law, the foreign insolvency representative can apply for a
domestic insolvency proceeding before the recognition of the foreign
proceeding. Chiyong Rim has reported that as of the end of November 2016,
Korean courts only recognized six foreign bankruptcy proceedings.145

137

Recognition Law, supra note 10, at art. 25; ABE, supra note 86, at 328.
Yamamoto, supra note 21, at 83.
139
Id.
140
Article 633 of the DRBA provides that an order for recognition of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding
shall not affect the commencement or the continuation of local proceedings. DRBA, supra note 11, at art. 633;
see also RIM, supra note 87, at 586–587.
141
DRBA, supra note 11, at arts. 635, 636.
142
See RIM, supra note 87, at 587; Soogeun Oh, An Overview of the New Korean Insolvency Law, 16
NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 779 (2007).
143
DRBA, supra note 11, at art. 635; Soogeun Oh, An Overview of the New Korean Insolvency Law,
NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC., 2007 at 779.
144
See id.
145
RIM, supra note 87, at 584.
138
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A related point is the coordination of concurrent proceedings. Article 28 of
the Model Law allows the commencement of concurrent local proceedings even
after the recognition of the foreign main proceedings. Article 29 provides for the
coordination of the orders made between the two sets of proceedings. The Model
Law also allows for the recognition and the local proceedings to proceed in
parallel. However, the Japanese Recognition Law departs from Articles 28 and
29 because while it does not prohibit the commencement of proceedings, only
one proceeding is allowed to commence at a time, and priority is given to the
local proceeding with a stay on the recognition proceeding, unless certain
exceptions apply.146 In Korea, there are also differences between the Model Law
and domestic legislation on how concurrent proceedings are managed; the
recognition of the foreign proceeding is a prerequisite to the foreign insolvency
representative commencing domestic proceedings in Korea, 147 and it is not
possible to commence the domestic proceedings until obtaining recognition.
This process ensures the Seoul District Court has the expertise and should hear
the recognition case first.148
6. Judicial Communication and Cooperation
While Singapore and Australia adopted Article 25 of the Model Law,149 this
is an area where the civil law countries diverged “in the books.”150 Japan has not
adopted Article 25, which provides for court-to-court communication and
cooperation. Yamamoto has argued that express enactment of this provision is
unnecessary. Inherent power stems from court cooperation. 151 Certainly in
Japan, evidence of assistance and cooperation with foreign courts exists. A study

146
Recognition Law, supra note 10, at arts. 57–60, (Japan). The conditions are where the foreign
proceeding is a “foreign main proceeding,” recognition of the foreign proceeding will be of benefit to the general
interests of creditors (including creditors outside Japan) and the interests of local creditors will not be unjustly
harmed by the recognition of the foreign proceeding.
147
See DRBA, supra note 11, at art. 634.
148
See Soogeun Oh, An Overview of the New Korean Insolvency Law, 16 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
5, arts. 5, 19 (2007).
149
The development of international judicial cooperation between courts may also take place in the form
of bilateral arrangements. For example, in September 2018, Singapore has signed two Memoranda of
Understanding with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and for the South District of New
York to effect judicial cooperation between Singapore and with each of these courts. See Supreme Court,
Towards Greater Excellence in Cross-Border Insolvency, SUPREME CT. SINGAPORE, https://www.supremecourt.
gov.sg/news/media-releases/towards-greater-excellence-in-cross-border-insolvency (last visited October 11,
2019). For the position in Australia, see Sheryl Jackson & Rosalind Mason, Developments in Court to Court
Communications in International Insolvency Cases, 37(2) U.N.S.W.L.J. 507, 512–19 (2014).
150
See Companies Act, 2006, ch.50, sched. 10, art. 25 (Sing.); see also Cross-Border Insolvency Act,
2008, s 6 (Austl.).
151
See ABE, supra note 86, at 324.
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by Anderson Mori and Tomotsune provides that, as of April 2017, the Tokyo
District Court provided relief in fifteen cases either through administration
orders (appointment of a trustee to administer the Japanese assets of a foreign
company) or stay orders (prohibiting enforcement by creditors against Japanese
assets so as to facilitate foreign restructurings).152 In the same study, the authors
argued that while Japan does not have an Article 25 equivalent, the Tokyo
District Court “has generally provided assistance to foreign trustees and
[debtors-in-possession (DIPs)] immediately after the recognition of the relevant
foreign proceeding. This is because debtors are generally able to hold prior
consultation with the [Tokyo District Court], which enables the [court to]
carefully review cases in advance.”153
In Korea, Article 641 of the DRBA adopts Model Law Article 25 but limits
the court’s cooperation with a foreign court or a representative of a foreign
insolvency proceeding. 154 Other persons, such as an examiner, do not have
power to communicate with the foreign court or a foreign representative.155 Rim
has argued that South Korean courts are more likely to communicate and
exchange information via the foreign representative than through direct
communication because of the differences in legal systems and language
issues. 156 However, such an impediment may not actually be borne out in
practice. In recent years, it has been reported that the Korean judges cooperated
with New Jersey judges by participating in a conference call during a recent
cross-border insolvency case involving a Korean shipping company.157
Moreover, Korea has entered into a Memoranda of Understanding regarding
judicial cooperation. In April and May 2018 respectively, the Seoul Bankruptcy

152
See Yuri Ide & Atsushi Nishitani, Legal Framework of Cross-Border Insolvency in Japan, ANDERSON
MORI & TOMOTSUNE, 1, 3–4 (2017), https://www.amt-law.com/asset/en/pdf/bulletins11_pdf/170531.pdf.
Similarly, Shin Abe reports that there are 15 cases as of 2017. See ABE, supra note 86, at 330. Cf. Irit Mevorach,
On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of the UNCITRAL Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency, 12(4) E.B.O.R. 517, 546–49 (2011), which only records three cases from Japan granting
relief as at 2010.
153
See Ide & Nishitani, supra note 151, at 3–4.
154
DRBA, supra note 11, at art. 641.
155
RIM, supra note 87, at 595.
156
Id.
157
Allen & Overy has reported the cooperation between the Korean court and the New Jersey court in
dealing with a cross-border insolvency in 2017. See Restructuring Across Borders, ALLEN & OVERY, 9
(December
2017),
http://www.allenovery.com/expertise/practices/restructuring/Pages/Korea-corporaterestructuring.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2019).
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Court has separately executed a Memorandum with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York158 and Singapore insolvency cases.159
7. The Hotchpot Rule or Rule of Payment in Concurrent Proceedings
Article 32 of the Model Law ensures that outside of secured claims and rights
in rem, a creditor who has received partial payment in respect to a foreign
proceeding may not receive a payment on the same claim in the local proceeding
regarding the same debtor, without bringing into the hotchpot his foreign
payment. The rationale of the rule has variously been described as founded on
the pari passu principle, 160 or to prevent the distortion of the policy of
distribution that applies to insolvency. 161 The rule prevents creditors from
gaining more favourable treatment, as compared with other creditors in the same
class, in insolvency proceedings in different jurisdictions. Singapore 162 and
Australia 163 both adopted Article 32 of the Model Law. In particular, for
Australia, the rule is not controversial because of its long history in the common
law tradition. 164 The exclusion of secured claims and rights in rem is also
consistent with the common law because secured creditors claim primarily from
their rights in rem, and it is the value from their rights in rem that satisfy their
claims. If their claims are not satisfied from their rights in rem, they look to
repayment of the balance as unsecured creditors.
In Korea and Japan, their legislation is based on Article 32 of the Model
Law, but there are significant departures. In Japan, secured creditors are subject
to the hotchpot rule under the Corporate Reorganization Law,165 and a creditor
in a local proceeding may receive the dividend after deducting the amounts
collected from the foreign proceedings.166 Japanese scholars identify two further
differences between the Japanese legislation and Model Law. First, payments
outside foreign insolvency proceedings, including payments in execution
158
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Seoul Bankruptcy Court and the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, 1–2 (2019), http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/MOU_SDNYBK_SBC.pdf.
159
Towards Greater Excellence in Cross-Border Insolvency, supra note 149, at 4–6.
160
See Banco de Portugal v. Waddell [1880) 5 App. Cas. 161 (UKHL) (Eng.); Cleaver v. Delta American
Reinsurance [2001] UKPC 6, [2001], 2 AC 328 (on appeal from Cayman Is.) (Eng.).
161
Look Chan Ho, Insolvency Policy and the Pari Passu Principle, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, 288–290 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2016).
162
See Companies Act, 2006, art. 32, sched. 10 (Sing.).
163
See Cross-Border Insolvency Act, 2008, s 6 (Austl.).
164
For Australia, see Re Harris, Goodwin & Co (1887) 5 QLJ (NC) 94; for U.K. see Cleaver v. Delta
American Reinsurance Co [2001] UKPC 6, [2001] 2 AC 328 (on appeal from Cayman Is.) (Eng.).
165
Corporate Reorganization Act, Law no. 154 of 2002, art. 137 (Japan).
166
ABE, supra note 86, at 329.
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proceedings or voluntary payments by debtors, are subject to the rule.167 This
differs from the Model Law, which only affects payments in foreign insolvency
proceedings.168 These same Japanese scholars described the rationale as aiming
for ‘high-grade cooperation and more equal treatment of creditors.’169 Second,
the Japanese legislation is confined only to payments after the commencement
of local proceedings, though it has been argued that this may not be significant
in practice. 170 However, the outcomes may not differ significantly from the
common law position in Australia or Singapore. In Australian common law, the
hotchpot rule does not capture payments made outside of foreign proceedings,171
though it is possible that under the domestic insolvency laws, such payments
may be set aside on the ground of unfair preference. In Singaporean common
law, payments made before the commencement of local proceedings do not fall
within the hotchpot rule.172
Korea enacted Article 642 of the DRBA, which differs from Article 32 of
the Model Law in two material respects. First, Article 642 of the DRBA captures
payments not only in foreign proceedings but also judgment execution and
foreclosure proceedings. 173 Second, Article 642 is silent on the exclusion of
secured claims, which indicates that secured claims fall within Article 642. The
rationale for this view is that secured debts are subject to the rehabilitation
proceedings in Korea.174 Min Han has taken a different view and argued that
payment recovered from collateral outside of Korea should not be affected by
Article 642. 175 Article 642 has been described as giving rise to complex

167

Yamamoto, supra note 21, at 95.
Model Law, Article 32.
169
Yamamoto, supra note 21, at 95.
170
Id.
171
The hotchpot rules applies in respect of a creditor who has received full or partial satisfaction of debt
through an attachment that is subsequent to the opening of a UK insolvency process rather than by means of an
existing security interest. See 3 EDWARD MANSON, REPORTS OF CASES IN BANKRUPTCY AND COMPANIES’
WINDING-UP, DECIDED IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, THE COURT OF APPEAL, AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS
(1894–1915) 134–35 (Sweet & Maxwell 1896) (discussing Re S.F. Somes, Ex parte De Lemos (1896) 3 Mans
131). On the other hand, a creditor who has completed an attachment before the opening of English insolvency
proceedings is in a position akin to that of a secured creditor and may keep what she has received. See Cleaver
v. Delta American Reinsurance [2001] UKPC 6, [2001] 2 AC 328; and see generally the discussion in CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCY 511–514 (Richard Sheldon ed., Bloomsbury Professional 4th ed. 2015).
172
See Cleaver v. Delta American Reinsurance Co [2001] UKPC 6 [25], [2001] 2 AC 328 (on appeal from
Cayman Is.) (Eng.) (citing Banco de Portugal v. Waddell [1880) 5 App. Cas. 161 (UKHL) (Eng.)] (noting that,
on the facts of that case: “had the Portuguese creditors received their dividend before the commencement of the
English liquidation, they would not have been required to bring it into the hotchpot as a condition of proving in
England.”).
173
See RIM, supra note 87, at 595–596.
174
See RIM, supra note 87, at 595.
175
Id.; Min Han, The Hotchpot Rule in Korean Insolvency Proceedings, 7 J. KOREAN L. 445, 445–468
168
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problems. 176 For payments that are made without concurrent foreign
proceedings, some other mechanism within Korean law will need to be invoked
to achieve equality of payments among the creditors within the same class.
II. REASONS FOR THE DIVERGENCE IN IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES
A. Legal Origins
Scholars have long argued that convergence towards a set of international
norms may be based on historical and other legacies. Katharina Pistor argues
that colonial legacies may produce convergence in the resolution of problems
based around legal families such as common law or civil law.177 Halliday and
Carruthers argue that such convergence may then be reinforced by U.S.
dominance of both the legal regulation and rule of law discourse.178 Scholars
point out that Model Law is based on an American ideal of modified
universalism.179 The English common law reflected the principle of universality
(at least insofar as regarding its own insolvency proceedings),180 and it could be
expected that states which follow the Anglo-American model (such as Singapore
and Australia) will be more ready to adopt solutions provided by the Model Law.
The argument based on legal origins has some support in the literature. As
mentioned in the Introduction, Yamamoto argues that civil law countries find it
difficult to adopt wholesale provisions of the Model Law. He argues that
evidence of such difficulty can be seen in the provisions on communication and
cooperation, where civil law judges have difficulty dealing with judge
discretion. 181 However, Anderson argued that such an explanation is not
(2008).
176

See RIM, supra note 87, at 595–596.
Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP.
L. 97 (2001).
178
TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND SYSTEMIC
FINANCIAL CRISIS 10 (Stanford Univ. Press 2009).
179
The earlier law contained in U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 304 as originally enacted (allowing for foreign
insolvency representative to file ancillary proceedings to seek assistance in the U.S.). See 11 U.S.C. § 304
(1978). The provision has since been repealed by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act. See also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 23, 145 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 102(g)(3), 1325(a)).
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Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc,
[2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 AC 508 [16]–[17] (appeal from The Isle of Man); see also In re HIH Casualty and
General Insurance Ltd., [2008] UKHL 21 [6]–[10] (Eng.); McMahon v. McGrath [2008] 1 WLR 852, [856]–
[857] (Eng.).
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convincing, considering other civil law states adopted these Model Law
provisions without such qualification. 182 Further, more recent developments
show that the civil law courts in Korea are taking more proactive steps in
entering into judicial cooperation.183
At first sight, the legal origins theory appears attractive, but does not provide
a complete account of the divergence. A number of examples demonstrate this
point. For instance, as highlighted in Section I, Singapore and Australia enacted
diverging public policy riders, subject to different interpretations. In Singapore,
the High Court took the view that a lower standard exists to invoke the public
policy ground. 184 Korea and Japan’s choices in the examples discussed in
Section I are not founded in civil law traditions. Three examples are highlighted.
First, Korea and Japan did not adopt an automatic stay consequential to a
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings. 185 The reason was not the
inability of civil law to produce the consequences of an automatic stay, but rather
for reasons linked closely to the path dependence. 186 The Korean and Japanese
law prior to the Model Law did not provide for such stays or reforms to their
laws as a consequence of the Asian financial crisis (in the case of Japan) or the
prolonged downturn of the economy (in the case of Japan).187
Second, Korea and Japan also give priority to local proceedings where there
are concurrent foreign and recognition proceedings. Korea limits the insolvency
representative’s ability to file local proceedings before recognition;
comparatively, Japan stays the recognition of foreign proceedings to give
priority to local proceedings unless certain exceptions apply. 188 Japan also
requires separate court approval for the assets to be turned over to the insolvency
representative.189 No academic literature suggests that Korea and Japan’s failure
to follow the framework of the Model Law was due to inherent difficulty based
on the civil law traditions or any precedents.

that common law judges can rely on the inherent jurisdiction of the court in the way that civil law judges may
not be able to do so); see generally Raj Bhala, International Dimensions of Japanese Insolvency Law,
MONETARY AND ECON. STUD. 131 (2001).
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Anderson, supra note 94, at 13–14.
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See supra Section I(B)(6).
184
See In re Zetta Jets Pte Ltd. [2018] SGHC [21], [23] (Sing.).
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See supra Section I(B)(5).
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See supra Section I(B)(4).
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Third, where Korean and Japanese law is silent, as it is on tax, social security,
and transaction avoidance claims, the legislation under the respective
jurisdictions chooses not to explicitly adopt the Model Law position.190 This
suggests that where Korea and Japan do not have an explicit domestic law
solution, they prefer a “wait-and-see” approach, rather than adopting the
uniformity and harmonization of the Model Law.
B. Signalling Effect
We present an alternative theory. We argue that where states are considering
shifting from a moderately territorialist approach toward cross-border
insolvency to the Model Law’s modified universalism approach, they are more
likely to fully implement the Model Law. Comparatively, where states start from
an exclusively territorialist approach, they are likely to be more circumspect and
require more exceptions or carve-outs from the Model Law. This avoids giving
full effect to the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings.
We draw a parallel example to deviations from international standards that
are driven by multilateral organizations despite states’ ostensible adoption of
standards. Post-Asian financial crisis of 1997, based on the studies in Indonesia,
Thailand, South Korea, and Malaysia, Andrew Walter has pointed out that there
is substantial “mock” compliance with G7-led projects on international financial
regulation (relating to banking and securities regulation, corporate governance,
disclosures, and policy transparency). 191 Such cosmetic or mock compliance
arises from, among others, path dependence and the enduring concentration of
family owned companies.192 These make compliance very costly for the private
actors.193
In this regard, we turn to our case studies. Singapore and Australia, prior to
their adoption of the Model Law, were moving towards a modified universalist
approach towards cross-border insolvency. In Singapore, prior to the adoption
of the Model Law in May 2017, there was no comprehensive legislation on
dealing with cross-border insolvency. The Companies Act then provided for a
‘ring fencing’ rule. If a company registered in Singapore as a foreign company
was the subject of a Singapore secondary liquidation, then assets collected in the
course of the Singapore proceedings should be set aside for the payment of debts
incurred in Singapore, before being remitted to the foreign liquidator in the
190
191
192
193

See supra Section I(B)(4).
See generally Walter, supra note 34.
See id.
See id.
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foreign insolvency proceedings. 194 However, apart from the legislative
provisions which constrain the remission of assets of an insolvent foreign
company, more recent case law demonstrates the courts’ willingness to provide
other forms of assistance at common law regarding foreign insolvency
proceedings. In the unreported judgment of Re Aero Inventory (UK) Limited,195
cited in Beluga, the Singapore High Court recognized an administration order
made by the English High Court and held that the administrators of an English
company would have the same power over the company’s property and assets in
Singapore as they had under English law. A similar order was made recently in
respect of the recognition of the administration order made against All Leisure
Holidays.196 Further examples are given by (then) Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong
on the Singapore courts giving effect to modified universalism, in the form of
recognition of foreign proceedings. 197 In Re Opti-Medix, the High Court
expressed the view that:
In cross-border insolvency, there has been a general movement away
from the traditional, territorial focus on the interests of the local
creditors, towards recognition that universal cooperation between
jurisdictions is a necessary part of the contemporary world. Under a
[u]niversalist approach, one court takes the lead while other courts
assist in administering the liquidation. This is the most conductive to
the orderly conduct of business and resolution of business failures
across jurisdictions.198

Prior to the enactment of the Model Law and apart from the common law,
Australia had (and still has) the following provisions that are relevant to crossborder insolvency: Corporations Act 2001, sections 580-581 (the aid and
auxiliary provisions), section 583 (the winding up of foreign companies
provisions), and section 601CL (the ancillary liquidation provision).199 These
aid and auxiliary, and ancillary liquidation provisions, reflect a modified
universalist approach towards cross-border insolvency, though the Model Law

194
Companies Act 2006, § 377(3)(c) (Sing.) (prior to the amendment in 2017); see Beluga Chartering
GmbH (in liquidation) and Others. v. Beluga Projects (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Another [2014] 2 SLR 815 (Sing.).
195
See Beluga Chartering GmbH (in liquidation) and Others. v. Beluga Projects (Singapore) Pte Ltd and
Another [2014] 2 SLR 815, [88] (Sing.).
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Andrew Chan et al., Singapore, in CROSS BORDER INSOLVENCY: A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW 500 (Look Chan Ho ed., Globe Law and Business, 4th ed. 2017). Cf. 2013 Report, supra note 8, at
230 (Singapore Insolvency Law Review Committee arguing that there is some reported authority to show that
recognition at common law is limited.).
197
See generally Sek Keong Chan, Cross-Border Insolvency Issues Affecting Singapore, 23 SACLJ 413
(2011).
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Re Opti-Medix Ltd, [2016] 4 SLR 312, [17] (Sing.).
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McCormack and Hargovan, supra note 44.
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made further moves in that direction.200 For example, in the aid and auxiliary
provisions, a distinction is drawn between prescribed and non-prescribed states.
Prescribed states require that aid of auxiliary provisions to the foreign courts is
mandatory, and in non-prescribed states, such aid is discretionary. Insofar as the
ancillary liquidation provisions are concerned, section 601CL(14) contemplates
a universalist approach towards cross-border insolvency in that the Australian
court appoints an Australian liquidator of the foreign company on the application
of the foreign liquidator. Section 601(15) requires the Australian liquidator to
recover and realize the foreign company’s property in Australia, and to pay the
net amount so recovered and realized to the foreign liquidator. Section 601(15)
does not provide for ring fencing of the local assets in the way that section 377(c)
of the Singapore Companies Act previously required, and some ambiguity exists
as to whether the court will order a full remission of the assets abroad pursuant
to section 601(15) if the foreign scheme of distribution differs from the
Australian scheme.201
Thus, in Singapore and Australia, albeit in different degrees, the courts have
been receptive to more universalist principles in the management of international
insolvencies and are likely to be influenced by criticisms of the territoriality
principles.
However, Korea and Japan started from an exclusively territorialist
position.202 Both jurisdictions adopted the legislation based on the Model Law
partly in response to domestic and international criticism on their treatment of
cross-border insolvency post-crises. While both jurisdictions adopted legislation
based on the Model Law and allow for the recognition of foreign insolvency
proceedings, pre-existing outcomes under existing legislation remain preserved
in a number of ways. We argue that the recognition of foreign insolvency
proceedings sends an important signal of adhering to global norms of modified
universalism post-crisis and yet simultaneously allows both jurisdictions to
avoid committing to allowing the full effects of recognition otherwise found in
the Model Law. However, once we go deeper on the detailed impact of the
adoption of the Model Law in different jurisdictions, we see significant
divergences.
The reasons are as follows. Korea’s wide-ranging bankruptcy reforms were
brought closer to international standards, including having in place
200
See Rosalind Mason, Implications of the UNCITRAL Model Law for Australian Cross-Border
Insolvencies, 8(2) INT’L. INSOLV. REV. 83, 107 (1999).
201
See McCormack and Hargovan, supra note 44, at 401.
202
See supra Section I(A).
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reorganisation proceedings in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997,
due to pressure from the IMF and World Bank. While Korea adopted numerous
bankruptcy reforms, it excluded provisions such as an automatic stay on debt
collection upon application for bankruptcy. This exclusion was heavily resisted.
Thus, it was not surprising that Korea resisted adopting the automatic stay from
the Model Law and has limited a number of consequences that will otherwise
follow from the recognition. Thus, in Korea, the reforms on substantive
bankruptcy law deal more with signaling as opposed to full functional reform;
the same can be said for the Model Law. 203 However, judicial attitudes
sometimes change, as evidenced in Korea’s recent Memorandum of
Understanding with foreign courts.
Likewise, in Japan, the Recognition Law gives effect to recognizing of
foreign insolvency proceedings but provides various ways for which the
judiciary could avoid giving full effect to the consequences of the recognition.
The differences between Korea and Japan on one hand, and Australia and
Singapore on the other hand, relating to the hotchpot rule or rule of payment in
concurrent proceedings, also reflects the resistance of civil law countries to
being brought in line with the common law position. As discussed in Section
I(B)(7), some of the differences are founded in regulatory philosophy. Both
Korea and Japan recognize the payments made pursuant to the secured claims
on the grounds of equality of treatment of creditors but such payments are
typically excluded at common law. There are also differences in what kinds of
payments are caught by the rule, such as payments outside the foreign
insolvency proceedings (as is the case in Japan but not in Australia or
Singapore). While the differences may not have been presented as significant
impediments in practice, they nevertheless illustrate the limitations of securing
harmonization.
Finally, there is a preference by Korea and Japan to remain silent and not
explicitly deal with certain areas of law in their respective legislation where the
legal provisions are unclear. Korea and Japan chose not to adopt the solutions in
the Model Law, such as those relating to the possible application of foreign law
on tax and social security claims, 204 and the application of foreign law on
transaction avoidance.205 This indicates that these countries prefer a wait and see
approach.
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR UNCITRAL
The drafters of the Model Law hoped that the Model Law would simplify
and harmonize insolvency processes world-wide. However, the differences in
the way that the Model Law has been implemented in domestic legislation and
interpreted by local courts demonstrate persistent divergences, even though
courts and practitioners broadly apply what appears to be general principles.
These divergences led UNCITRAL to formulate a recent supplemental Model
Law addressing the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related
judgments.206
In certain cases, the differences are substantive in nature. Drawing from the
implementation of the Model Law in Australia, Singapore, Japan, and Korea,
the differences as to how public policy carve-outs from the operation of the
Model Law (both at a general level and in respect to the discrete issues such as
protection of local creditors and treatment of foreign creditors) are implemented
and interpreted act as an impediment to reaching uniformity. The scope of the
implementing laws on proceedings that are subject to the Model Law also
differs, depending on the legislative tweaks impacting what are regarded as laws
relating to insolvency and collective proceedings. The effects of the recognition
of foreign insolvency proceedings differs as well, with Japan and Korea
departing from the basic Model Law norms.
In other cases, the Model Law is ambiguous on important terms, which is
likely the result of compromise among the drafters. The kinds of relief available
to foreign insolvency representatives and the potential application of foreign law
in the recognising state, including the availability of transaction avoidance
remedies, are left to be interpreted by the recognising courts. The variations in
the implementation of the hotchpot rule in Japan and Korea may also result in
uncertainty as to how these provisions will work in practice.
Yet, there are cases where the differences in the implementation in the Model
Law may not have much substantive impact. Japan and Korea’s more limited
provisions on cooperation and court-to-court communication have not precluded
such cooperation in practice. However, the question remains as to why they have
chosen not to adopt the Model Law in full, which would address the certainty
and predictability issues.

206
See generally Adrian Walters, Modified Universalisms & The Role of Local Legal Culture in the
Making of Cross-Border Insolvency Law, 93 AM. BANKR. L.J. 47 (2019).
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We argue that the differences result not only from the difference in legal
origins of the states but also from the intentions of the states in signaling their
intention of compliance. This may impact the practical realizability of the
UNCITRAL’s initiatives to facilitate cross-border insolvency of enterprise
groups,207 as well as the recent enhancement of recognition and enforcement of
insolvency-related judgments. As globalisation becomes more pervasive and
economically significant, countries have groups of companies with ‘member’
companies incorporated in different jurisdictions, management of cross-border
insolvency that benefits debtors, and creditors and other stakeholders have
become a priority. Thus, states have moved away from an exclusively
territorialist approach and toward modified universalist and judicial approaches
that also reflect such convergence.208
While the Model Law represents a kind of modified universalism,
participating countries which traditionally adopted a more exclusively
territorialist approach towards cross-border insolvency are more likely to require
local carve-outs and modifications to be convinced that implementation of the
Model Law will work in their best interest. Finally, we should also mention that
there are larger political factors that may also influence States in how they adopt
the Model Law. For example, even though the common law approach in Canada
prior to the adoption of the Model Law has been one of modified universalism,209
Canada chose to make significant changes in its implementation of the Model
Law,210 notably by allowing for recognition of a greater number of cases than
the strict Model Law provisions would permit. 211 Such cases are likely to
emanate from the United States.212
207
See Draft UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency, U.N. COMM’N. ON INT’L TRADE L.
(2019),
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[2010] EWCA Civ 895 and [2011] EWCA Civ 97), where the court declined to uphold a new basis for
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recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment.
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